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What determines the level of entrepreneurial activity in an economy? One key variable is
the extent to which failed entrepreneurs are excluded from further entrepreneurial ￿nance.
European and Japanese ￿nanciers, for instance, are perceived to be more reluctant to
￿nance a failed entrepreneur￿ s restart than their American counterparts. It therefore has
become commonplace to praise the US￿lower ￿stigma of failure￿as the source of its higher
entrepreneurship rates1 and consequently of its competitive edge in terms of the ability
to innovate, commercialize and grow.2
In this paper, we present endogenous risk choice as an explanation for why economies
with identical cultural and institutional constraints can experience di⁄erent levels of the
￿stigma of failure￿ . If the ￿stigma of failure￿is high and banks provide credit only to those
who have never failed, entrepreneurs will choose low-risk projects. In this economy, failure
indicates low entrepreneurial talent. If the ￿stigma of failure￿is low and banks provide
credit to failed entrepreneurs, new entrepreneurs will be more inclined to experiment
with novel (and more risky) business ideas. Failure at the beginning of an entrepreneurial
career then indicates bad luck rather than low entrepreneurial talent.
To get an intuition for the model, imagine an entrepreneur who can undertake one of
two projects, a low-risk project or a high-risk project. Both projects have no investment
costs. The low-risk project yields a safe return of yL > 0. The high-risk project fails with
probability pH 2 (0;1) and then yields a return of 0. It succeeds with probability 1 ￿ pH
and then yields a return of yH > yL. The expected return of the low-risk project is higher
than the expected return of the high-risk project, yL > (1 ￿ pH)yH. If the entrepreneur
has only one chance to undertake a project, she should clearly choose the low-risk project.
However, assume now that, in the case of success, she works on the project and enjoys
its returns; while in the case of failure, she can start a new project and faces the same
choice.3 What project should the entrepreneur now choose? If she chooses the low-risk
project, she will earn yL. If she always chooses the high-risk project, she will succeed for
sure after ￿nite time and earn yH. Therefore, it is optimal to go for the high-risk project.
In our model, there are two complications to this scenario. First, there are investment
1GEM (2008) reports that in 2007, 10.8% of adults were engaged in early-stage entrepreneurship in
the US as compared to only 5.4% in the EU or 5.4% in Japan.
2See Bottazzi et al: (2003), EU Commission (2000), SME Agency (1999) or Wennekers et al: (2006).
3For example, both projects could be a business that has no value except for the human capital
of the entrepreneur (such as a gourmet restaurant). Returns only materialize if the entrepreneur runs
the project during her entire professional life. Another interpretation is that once the entrepreneur has
established a successful business, she gets settled such that her costs of starting a new business become
prohibitively large.
2costs that cannot be ￿nanced by the entrepreneur herself. She has to apply for a loan on
a competitive credit market. Second, her entrepreneurial talent, which is either high or
low, in￿ uences her probability of success, but is unknown to her and to banks. Only the
distribution of talent is common knowledge. The entrepreneur and banks learn about her
talent from the outcome of the project. However, learning depends on the project￿ s risk:
failure with a low-risk (high-risk) project implies a relatively low (high) probability of
high talent. Given that the ex-ante probability of high talent is su¢ ciently close to unity,
the ￿rst-best outcome is as follows. The entrepreneur ￿rst undertakes high-risk projects.
After continuous failures, she undertakes the low-risk project. Failure with the low-risk
project discloses low talent, therefore she stops undertaking projects at all.
Under what circumstances is the ￿rst-best outcome an equilibrium outcome and what
other equilibria exist? We consider three di⁄erent informational settings: perfect informa-
tion (PI), private information of banks (PIB) and imperfect information (IM). Under
PI, banks can observe both the entrepreneur￿ s past and present risk choices. In this
setting, all parties equally learn about her talent. Hence, only the ￿rst-best outcome is a
sequential equilibrium. Under PIB, banks only observe the risk of projects in their own
loan portfolio. Several equilibria may now co-exist. In the ￿rst equilibrium, the entrepre-
neur undertakes a low-risk project and, if it fails, does not get any more loans. This is due
to the fact that only one bank observes the entrepreneur￿ s choice. This bank becomes a
monopolistic supplier of ￿nance if all other banks expect that the entrepreneur undertakes
a low-risk project. This equilibrium is ine¢ cient since the entrepreneur undertakes the
low-risk project too early. In the second equilibrium, the entrepreneur ￿rst undertakes
high-risk projects and then, after continuous failures, a low-risk project.
Under IM, banks never observe the risk of projects. This causes a moral hazard
problem. The entrepreneur chooses the low-risk project only if the expected payo⁄of the
high-risk project is su¢ ciently small relative to that of the low-risk project. As under
PIB, multiple equilibria may again exist. Also the pareto-ranking remains the same. Yet,
if the expected payo⁄ of the high-risk project is close to that of the low-risk project, the
entrepreneur will only undertake high-risk projects in equilibrium. Thus, if the ex-ante
probability of high talent is su¢ ciently close to unity, multiple rounds of project ￿nancing
must occur in equilibrium. We may then get a non-monotonic relationship between bank
information and potential credit market ine¢ ciency: under PI, the outcome is always
e¢ cient, while under PIB, there is always an equilibrium with only one period of project
￿nancing. This equilibrium may be strictly dominated by any equilibrium under IM in
which the entrepreneur untertakes several high-risk projects.
In addition, we study the equilibrium set in the presence of a credit register that
3informs all banks about the interest rates of previously chosen loan contracts. Under
PIB, such a credit register can ensure the existence of an e¢ cient equilibrium. The
reason is that the register transmits the entrepreneur￿ s risk choice to the extent that if
the entrepreneur chose a contract with a very low loan rate, this may indicate that she
undertook a low-risk project (otherwise, the bank that o⁄ered this contract would have
made negative expected pro￿ts). In this case, banks then stop o⁄ering loans. As long
as it is unpro￿table to undertake a low-risk project that is ￿nanced with a loan tailored
for high-risk projects, there will be an equilibrium in which the entrepreneur undertakes
projects as in the ￿rst-best outcome. Under IM, a credit register can have the same
e⁄ect.
These results yield a number of policy implications. A bank￿ s ability to observe both
past and present entrepreneurial risk choices may be crucial in preventing credit market
ine¢ ciencies. Detailed credit registers help to accomplish this task because past loan rates
may indicate whether a failed business was a high- or low-risk project. Furthermore, we
show that with asymmetric information about past risk choices, potential gains from an
increase in the population￿ s entrepreneurial talent might not fully be realized.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After a literature review in Section
2, Section 3 introduces the model and characterizes the ￿rst-best outcome. Section 4
analyzes the model under di⁄erent informational settings. Section 5 discusses policy
implications. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
A considerable empirical literature tries to explain cross-country di⁄erences in the ￿stigma
of failure￿by using persistent institutional or cultural characteristics.4 Evidence con￿rms
that fresh starts are a⁄ected by bankruptcy laws (Armour and Cumming 2008). However,
the debate persists over which and how cultural traits shape attitudes towards entrepre-
neurial failure (see Licht and Siegel 2006, Hayton et al. 2002, Giannetti and Simonov
2004).5 Our contribution to this literature is to present a model that endogenizes the
￿stigma of failure￿ .
4Most research aims to identify individual characteristics that determine the propensity to entre-
preneurship per se, such as family background (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000, Słrensen 2007a), work
experience (Słrensen 2007b) or wealth (Hurst and Lusardi 2004).
5For instance, Burchell and Hughes (2006) ￿nd that GDP growth is not related to failure tolerance,
but positively related to second chancing willingness. Surveys, however, show more failure tolerance but
less second chancing willingness in the US than in the EU. In the US, the stigma should thus be higher
and entrepreneurship rates lower than in the EU, which contradicts empirical evidence.
4Several papers study models of entrepreneurial ￿nance with asymmetric information
and ￿nd multiple equilibria. Gromb and Scharfstein (2002) analyze an occupational choice
model in which agents either become entrepreneurs or intrapreneurs. When there are few
(many) entrepreneurs, the average quality of failed entrepreneurs is low (high). As a result,
the external labor market (that o⁄ers jobs to failed entrepreneurs) is poor (good), so that
few (many) agents start a venture on their own. In Landier (2006), the capital market
cannot distinguish between entrepreneurs who start a new venture because the previous
one failed and those who start a new venture to pursue a more promising project. This
can generate equilibria in which few (many) entrepreneurs restart because of the latter
cause and interest rates are high (low). This, in turn, justi￿es the entrepreneur￿ s decision.
Ghatak et al. (2007) consider a general equilibrium model in which wages for dependent
labor are low (high) when there are many (few) untalented entrepreneurs, which implies
that many (few) agents become entrepreneurs. In contrast to these papers, we endogenize
the number of rounds banks are willing to ￿nance an entrepreneur after failure. The driver
of our results is the link between risk choice and bank lending. New entrepreneurs will
choose risky (save) projects provided that banks (do not) ￿nance projects after failure.
Consequently, the average talent of failed entrepreneurs is high (low), such that multiple
rounds of project-￿nancing (do not) occur in equilibrium.
We also contribute to the literature on entrepreneurial risk-taking. A common expla-
nation for why entrepreneurs often bear substantial undiversi￿ed risk despite the lack of
a positive premium, are (over-) optimistic beliefs (see e.g. Landier and Thesmar 2009).
Vereshchagina and Hopenhayn (2009) interpret entrepreneurial risk-taking as a lottery
over future wealth that is chosen by borrowing-constrained agents. Limited liability then
makes poor and impatient agents (who have not yet saved much) take more risk. Cam-
panale (2010) rationalizes entrepreneurial risk-taking on the grounds that entrepreneurs
usually make small personal investments and gain large human capital from starting a
business. Risk-taking in our model is determined by the willingness of banks to ￿nance
new projects after failure.
3 The Model
We consider an economy populated by an entrepreneur E and banks Bk, k 2 f1;:::;Kg
with K ￿ 2.6 All agents are risk-neutral. E can undertake a project, which requires an
initial investment of 1. She has no wealth on her own. Thus, the project needs to be
￿nanced by banks. If E does not undertake a project or banks do not o⁄er any loans, the
game is over and all of the agents￿payo⁄s are 0. Otherwise, E chooses a loan contract and
6The results easily carry over to a continuum of entrepreneurs.
5nature decides on the project￿ s outcome. In case of success, project returns are realized,
E pays the loan rate and the game is over. In case of failure, no payments are made,
the ￿nancing bank loses its investment, and the game starts anew. Time is discrete and
denoted by t 2 f1;2;:::g, where period t > 1 is reached if and only if E undertook t ￿ 1
times projects that failed. There is no discounting between periods.
The Entrepreneur. In period 0, nature decides on E￿ s entrepreneurial talent ￿i, which
is high (i = H) with probability ￿1 2 (0;1) or low (i = L) with probability 1￿￿1. Talent
is time-invariant and unobservable to E and banks. Only ￿1 is commonly known. E can
undertake projects with high (j = H) or low (j = L) risk of failure pj. For simplicity, we
normalize 0 = pL < pH < 1 and 0 ￿ ￿L < ￿H = 1. The project￿ s return is determined by
E￿ s talent and choice of risk j: it is yj with probability (1 ￿ pj)￿i and 0 with probability
1 ￿ (1 ￿ pj)￿i. The high-risk project yields higher returns, yL < yH. If E has high (low)
talent, projects have positive (negative) value:
(1 ￿ pj)yj > 1 and (1 ￿ pj)￿Lyj < 1 for j 2 fL;Hg: (1)
Banks. Banks compete in a Bertrand manner by o⁄ering loan contracts. Their re￿-
nancing costs are normalized to 0. To apply the concept of sequential equilibrium (SE),















where [y]+ denotes the smallest integer higher than or equal to y. A contract o⁄er of
Bk appears as (k;r; ￿ p), where r 2 R(") is the loan rate and ￿ p 2 fpL;pHg the maximum
riskiness of the project. If E chooses a contract (k;r; ￿ p) with ￿ p = pL, then E can only
undertake the low-risk project. If ￿ p = pH, then E can undertake any project. We thereby
allow banks to control the project risk (at a later stage, we drop this assumption). Without
loss of generality, we assume that each bank o⁄ers at most two contracts. Denote by Ck
t
(Ct) the set of all contract o⁄ers made by Bk (by all banks) in period t. Ct also contains
the zero-contract (0;0;0). If E chooses this contract, the game is over and payo⁄s are
0 for every agent in this period. Denote by Ck (C) the set of all possible Ck
t ￿ s (Ct￿ s).
In period t, E chooses at most one contract out of Ct and, given its terms, the project
risk j. If E has chosen contract (k;r; ￿ p) and risk j, then, in case of success, she earns
maxf0;yj ￿ rg, while Bk gets minfyj;rg.
Strategies, beliefs and equilibrium. Denote by Hk
t (HE
t ) the history of Bk (E) in
period t, i.e. everything Bk (E) has observed up to the beginning of period t. Let Hk
t
(HE
t ) be the set of such histories. We will clarify the details of Hk
t for each informational
6setting at a later stage. Throughout the paper, we assume that banks never observe their
competitors￿contract o⁄ers and always know how many times the entrepreneur failed. E
always recalls her previous choices and contract o⁄ers. Bk￿ s strategy ￿k is a sequence of
action functions ￿k
t for every t 2 f1;2;:::g, where ￿k
t gives Ck








E￿ s strategy ￿E is a sequence of action functions ￿E
t for every t 2 f1;2;:::g, where ￿E
t











t )) the belief of Bk (E) in period t that E has high talent
conditional on Hk
t (HE
t ). We will drop the reference to Hk
t (HE
t ) whenever it is clear from
the context. De￿ne the expected level of talent for given belief ￿ by ￿(￿) = ￿+(1￿￿)￿L.
















t=1. The assessment (￿;￿) is a
SE if (i) in each period, E and banks maximize expected payo⁄s for given beliefs and





is a totally mixed strategy pro￿le and ￿[n] is uniquely de￿ned from ￿[n] by Bayes￿rule.
De￿nition 1. A SE (assessment), in which E undertakes and banks ￿nance the high-
risk project in the ￿rst ￿ ￿1 periods and the low-risk project in period ￿, is called a ￿ ￿P
SE (assessment).
Projects and the First-Best Outcome. Assume for a moment that ￿1 = 1 and
banks are absent. Instead, E has ￿deep pockets￿and ￿nances all projects by herself. Her
expected payo⁄ from always choosing the high-risk project, V H, amounts to
V





Solving for V H yields V H = yH ￿ 1=(1 ￿ pH). Her expected payo⁄ from choosing the
low-risk project, V L, is given by V L = yL ￿1. We make two assumptions. First, if E has
only one chance to undertake a project, she will prefer the low-risk project:
Assumption (A1): yL > (1 ￿ pH)yH.
Second, if she has in￿nitely many opportunities to undertake a project, she will always
choose the high-risk project, i.e. V H > V L:
7Assumption (A2): yH ￿ 1=(1 ￿ pH) > yL ￿ 1.
In the following, we assume that both (A1) and (A2) hold.7 Now imagine that E has










H + (1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ (1 ￿ pH)￿L)t￿1 (6)
for each t > 1 if E has chosen j = H in all periods ￿ < t, and ￿E
t = 0 for t > 1 if E has
chosen j = L in at least one period ￿ < t. E￿ s expected payo⁄from realizing the low-risk











￿ ￿ ￿(￿L;yL): (7)
Given that ￿E
t = 2 [￿ ￿(￿L;yL);1], E does not undertake any projects in period t. As ￿1 < 1,
we have ￿E
t ! 0 for t ! 1. Therefore, she will not undertake high-risk projects in
in￿nitely many periods. We characterize the ￿rst-best outcome:
Proposition 1 There is a function
￿ t : [￿ ￿(￿L;yL);1) ! N;￿1 ! ￿ t(￿1)
such that E with ￿deep pockets￿maximizes her expected payo⁄ for given ￿1 (i) only if she
chooses j = H in all periods t ￿ ￿ t(￿1) ￿ 1, and (ii) if she chooses j = H in all periods
t ￿ ￿ t(￿1) ￿ 1 and j = L in period ￿ t(￿1). For each t 2 N, there is a ^ ￿1 < 1, such that
￿ t(￿1) > t whenever ￿1 > ^ ￿1.
Proof. See Appendix.
We will refer to this function a number of times. Without loss of generality, we assume
in the following that ￿1 is high enough such that ￿ t(￿1) > 1. Let V (￿1) be E￿ s expected
payo⁄ if she has ￿deep pockets￿and chooses j = H (j = L) in all periods t ￿ ￿ t(￿1) ￿ 1
(in period ￿ t(￿1)). An equilibrium is e¢ cient if and only if total expected payo⁄s in this
equilibrium equal V (￿1).
4 Equilibria Under Di⁄erent Informational Settings
4.1 Perfect Information (PI)
We ￿rst consider a setting with perfect information (PI), in which banks can observe all
of E￿ s risk choices. Note that if " is su¢ ciently small, then there is a Nash equilibrium
7Note that (A1) and (A2) can be satis￿ed at the same time if and only if yL > 1. This is the case as
both projects have a positive value as long as E has high skills.
8in which banks ￿nance the project in period 1, but never thereafter. Given that E has
only one chance to undertake a project, she chooses j = L. If she fails with this project,
banks know that E has low talent. This information, in turn, justi￿es the banks￿strategy.
However, the threat of no o⁄ers being made in period 2 if E has chosen j = H in period
1 is not credible. The reason is that all banks observe E￿ s decisions and update their
belief via Bayes￿rule. If E has chosen the high-risk project, it is still pro￿table for a bank
to ￿nance her after failure. As banks compete in a Bertrand manner, E can undertake
projects as if she had ￿deep pockets￿ . Thus, we can state:
Proposition 2 If " is su¢ ciently small, then under PI, total expected payo⁄s are V (￿1)
in any SE.
4.2 Private Information of Banks (PIB)
We now relax the assumption that banks can perfectly observe the riskiness of all past
projects. Instead, a bank can only observe the risk of projects in its own loan portfolio.
The risk of projects in other banks￿portfolios remains unknown. Therefore, banks acquire
private information about E. We consider an institutional setting with a credit register
(PIBcr) and one without (PIB). A credit register informs all banks about the loan
rates of E￿ s previously chosen loan contracts. Thus, under PIBcr, if E chooses contract
(k;r; ￿ p) in period t, then r becomes publicly known in periods ￿ > t, while E￿ s risk choice
in period t is observed only by Bk. Under PIB, banks only know the loan rates of their
own contract o⁄ers.8
We ￿rst study the case with credit registers. Consider an assessment in which E
chooses j = L in period 1 and no contract o⁄ers are made in period t ￿ 2. This assessment
can be a SE even if ￿1 is close to unity. To see why, assume that E deviates and chooses
a contract (k;r;pH) and j = H in period 1 instead of j = L. If her project fails, Bk
updates its belief about E￿ s type, knowing that she has chosen the high-risk project. All
other banks Bk0, k0 2 f1;:::;Kgnfkg, do not observe E￿ s deviation and assume that E
has chosen j = L in period 1. If they observe a high loan rate r, they may interpret
this as a mistake by E. Consequently, these banks will refuse to ￿nance E￿ s project in
any period t > 1. This makes Bk a monopolistic supplier of ￿nance to E. It can extract
almost all rents from E, leaving her with an expected payo⁄ of at most ". Therefore, it
can be optimal for E to undertake the low-risk project in period 1.
In addition, there can be an equilibrium in which E undertakes projects as if she had
￿deep pockets￿ . Consider a ￿ t(￿1) ￿ P assessment. If E deviates and chooses a contract
8Note that in the US, contract terms are not reported in credit registers, only success or failure.
9(k;r;pL) in period t ￿ ￿ t(￿1) ￿ 1, the credit register discloses r. If r is too low (i.e. the
bank that o⁄ered this contract would make a negative expected pro￿t if E chooses j = H
in period t), then banks may infer that E has chosen j = L in t and therefore refuse to
￿nance her in future periods. We only have to rule out that it does not pay o⁄ for E to
choose a contract (k;r;pH) and j = L, where r is such that the respective bank does not
make negative expected pro￿ts if E chooses j = H. This is implied by (A2) if yL is not
too high relative to the risk of failure of a high-risk project.
Proposition 3 Suppose that yL < 2=(1 ￿ pH). If " is su¢ ciently small, then under
PIBcr, there exists a ￿ ￿ P SE for ￿ 2 f1;￿ t(￿1)g. In any ￿ ￿ P SE with ￿ < ￿ t(￿1)
(￿ = ￿ t(￿1)), total expected payo⁄s are less than (equal to) V (￿1).
Proof. See Appendix.
In the absence of credit registers, the ine¢ cient 1 ￿ P equilibrium persists. However,
this must not be true for a ￿ t(￿1) ￿ P equilibrium. Note that under PIB, those banks
that do not ￿nance E￿ s project in period t ￿ ￿ t(￿)￿1 have no information about E￿ s risk
choice and the contract that E has signed in period t. Thus, it could be pro￿table for E
to undertake a low-risk project in a period t ￿ ￿ t(￿1)￿1 and then, in period t+1, switch
to another bank that assumes that E has chosen the high-risk project in period t. This
cannot happen in equilibrium. Therefore, a ￿ t(￿1)￿P equilibrium might not exist. In the
example below, we study a scenario, in which an e¢ cient equilibrium exists under PIBcr,
while it does not under PIB.
Consider now a ￿ t ￿ P assessment for some ￿ t > 1, in which the expected pro￿t of each
bank is at most ". If " is su¢ ciently small, E will not deviate to j = L in a period t < ￿ t
whenever she is relatively sure that she has high talent, i.e. if ￿E
t is relatively high. Thus,
for ￿1 su¢ ciently close to unity, a ￿ t ￿ P assessment can be an equilibrium under both
PIBcr and PIB.
Proposition 4 Let ￿ t 2 N be given. If ￿1 is su¢ ciently high and " is su¢ ciently small,
then under PIBcr and PIB, there exists a ￿ ￿ P SE for ￿ 2 f1;￿ tg and total expected
payo⁄s in the 1 ￿ P SE are smaller than in the ￿ t ￿ P SE.
Proof. See Appendix.
Example 1. Let yL = 2:5, pH = 0:3, ￿L = 0:3, ￿1 = 0:95, " = 0:001 and yH 2
f2:97;3:1;3:5g. If yH = 2:97, then (A1), (A2) hold and ￿ t(0:95) = 2. The total expected
payo⁄ of a 2￿P assessment would be ￿ 1;423, while the total expected payo⁄ of a 1￿P
assessment would be ￿ 1;412. Under PIB, only a 1 ￿ P SE exists, while under PIBcr,
10also a 2 ￿ P SE exists. If yH = 3:10, then (A1), (A2) hold and ￿ t(0:95) = 2. The
total expected payo⁄ of a 2 ￿ P assessment is now ￿ 1;511. There exist a 1 ￿ P and a
1￿P SE under both PIB and PIBcr. Finally, if yH = 3:50, then (A1), (A2) hold and
￿ t(0:95) = 3. For ￿ 2 f1;2;3g a ￿ ￿ P SE exists under PIB and PIBcr. Total expected
payo⁄s in the 3 ￿ P SE (2 ￿ P SE, 1 ￿ P SE) are ￿ 1:841 (￿ 1:781, ￿ 1:412).
4.3 Imperfect Information (IM)
We ￿nally turn to a setting with imperfect information, in which no bank can observe
E￿ s risk choices. It is no longer possible for banks to restrict E￿ s options in the contract.
Therefore, banks can only o⁄er contracts (:;:;pH). Again, we consider a setting with a
credit register that informs banks about the loan rates of previous contracts (IMcr) and
a setting without such a credit register (IM).
Under imperfect information, banks face a moral hazard problem. E may be inclined
to shift risk and undertake the high-risk project whenever banks o⁄er loan contracts that
guarantee non-negative pro￿ts, only if E chooses the low-risk project. If and only if the
following assumption on payo⁄s holds, can there be equilibria in which E chooses the
low-risk project:
Assumption (A3): yL ￿ 1 > (1 ￿ pH)(yH ￿ 1).
To see why, consider an assessment in which E chooses j = L in period t and all banks
charge a loan rate r￿ in this period. E￿ s risk choice does not a⁄ect future loan rates.
Therefore, she cannot gain by choosing j = H in period t as long as
￿(￿
E
t )(yL ￿ r
￿) ￿ ￿(￿
E
t )(1 ￿ pH)(yH ￿ r
￿): (8)
Thus, if
yL ￿ (1 ￿ pH)yH < pHr
￿; (9)
then E always chooses the high-risk project in equilibrium. If (A3) does not hold, then
yL ￿ (1 ￿ pH)yH ￿ pH: (10)
Banks make non-negative pro￿ts only if r￿ > 1. Hence, in equilibrium (10) implies (9).
The interpretation of (A3) is that the expected return of the low-risk project is su¢ ciently
high relative to the expected return of the high-risk project such that risk-shifting is not
pro￿table. Note that (A3) implies (A1) and that (A2) and (A3) can simultaneously
hold if yH > 2. Hence, we need to distinguish between two scenarios: one in which (A3)
does not hold and one in which (A3) holds.
11Equilibria if (A3) does not hold. A violation of (A3) means that E will always
choose the high-risk project and banks can make non-negative expected pro￿ts in period











￿ ￿ ￿(￿L;yH): (11)
De￿ne the maximum number of periods banks are willing to o⁄er loan contracts to E by














Proposition 5 If (A3) does not hold, ￿1 2 [￿ ￿(￿L;yH);1], and " is su¢ ciently small,
then in each SE under IMcr and IM, E undertakes high-risk projects in at least (at
most) ~ t(￿1) ￿ 1 (~ t(￿1)) periods. Furthermore, E never undertakes a low-risk project. In
each of these SE, total expected payo⁄s are less than V (￿1).
Clearly these equilibria are not pareto-optimal. In the period before banks stop o⁄ering
loans, E would prefer to undertake the low-risk project (given that the loan rate is adjusted
accordingly). Unable to commit to choose j = L, she ends up realizing the hig-risk project.
As we will see below, total expected payo⁄s in this equilibrium can be much higher than in
the ine¢ cient 1￿P SE under PIBcr and PIB, in which the banks￿equilibrium strategies
force E to undertake the low-risk project in the ￿rst period. We therefore obtain a non-
monotonic relationship between potential credit market ine¢ ciency and bank information
if (A3) does not hold.
Equilibria if (A3) does hold. If (A3) holds and ￿1 is su¢ ciently large, then again
multiple equilibria can occur. On the one hand, there can be a 1 ￿ P SE. The threat of
not providing any further loans is credible since banks do not observe E￿ s risk choice. On
the other hand, there can be a ￿ t ￿ P SE for some ￿ t > 1 if ￿1 is su¢ ciently high. In such
an equilibrium, banks correctly anticipate that E chooses j = H in all periods t < ￿ t and
set their loan rates accordingly.
Proposition 6 Let ￿ t 2 N be given. If (A3) holds, ￿1 is su¢ ciently high and " is su¢ -
ciently small, then under IMcr and IM, there exists a ￿ ￿ P SE for ￿ 2 f1;￿ tg and total
expected payo⁄s in the 1 ￿ P SE are smaller than in the ￿ t ￿ P SE.
Proof. See Appendix.
Again, a credit register may help to detect deviations by E. This is the case in the
example below. However, without further restrictions on the payo⁄ structure, a credit
register per se does not guarantee the existence of an e¢ cient equilibrium. The reason is
that in any ￿ t(￿1) ￿ P assessment, ￿E
￿ t(￿1) may be so small (and therefore the loan rates so
high) that E undertakes the high-risk project in period ￿ t(￿1).
12Example 2. Consider the same values as in Example 1. For yH 2 f2:97;3:10g, (A3)
holds and the equilibria for IM (IMcr) are the same as for PIB (PIBcr) in Example 1.9
Credit registers can therefore make a di⁄erence under imperfect information. However,
if yH = 3:5, then (A3) is violated and the only equilibrium outcome is that E chooses
the high-risk project in the ￿rst three periods and does not get any loans thereafter. The
total expected payo⁄ in these equilibria is ￿ 1;838 and therefore exceeds the total expected
payo⁄s of the ine¢ cient equilibria under PIB and PIBcr.
5 Policy Implications
Asymmetric Information. Economic theory has well established that asymmetric
information can lead to an ine¢ cient allocation of credit. The ￿nancial contracting lit-
erature has focused on solutions of the moral hazard problem if banks cannot directly
observe the entrepreneur￿ s risk choice (via monitoring, collateral or incentive contracts).
We have shown that the credit market equilibrium can be ine¢ cient even if the moral
hazard problem can be mitigated. In particular, this can happen if entrepreneurs can
start a new business after failure and banks cannot observe the entrepreneurs￿past risk
choices. Policies that aim to change the nature of the equilibrium may not be e⁄ective, as
both entrepreneurs￿actions and banks￿expectations would have to be changed simultane-
ously. Consider, for example, the approach of the European Commission (2000, 2007). It
attemps to reduce the ￿stigma of failure￿by advising entrepreneurs to choose higher risk
levels. Entrepreneurs, however, will follow such advice only if banks change their policy
at the same time.
Credit Registers. Information exchange between banks through credit registers can
increase credit market e¢ ciency.10 In our model, information about the loan rates of
previous contracts can be crucial to ensure the existence of more e¢ cient credit market
equilibria (in particular, under PIB and IM). This information enables banks to infer
E￿ s previous risk choices from loan rates. An unpaid loan with a relatively low loan rate
may indicate that the underlying project risk was low (otherwise, the bank would not have
o⁄ered this loan to the entrepreneur). Failure then discloses low entrepreneurial talent,
preventing banks from granting further loans to her. In contrast, an unpaid credit with a
high loan rate may indicate that the underlying project￿ s risk was high, suggesting that
its failure owes more to bad luck rather than low entrepreneurial talent. In this case, E
probably deserves another chance. However, note that the loan rate alone does not reveal
9We additionally have to show that risk-shifting does not pay o⁄ in the period in which E is supposed
to choose j = L.
10See Jappelli and Pagano (2000) for a literature review.
13E￿ s actions. Banks might also infer from a high loan rate that E undertook the low-risk
project and￿ by mistake￿ has chosen an inappropriate contract. Therefore, the multiplicity
of equilibria persists under PIBcr and IMcr.
Improving Entrepreneurial Talent. Another measure to increase entrepreneurial
activity is the promotion of education that leads to the formation of relevant skills. En-
trepreneurial education plays a substantial role both in economic development (see e.g.
Klinger and Sch￿ndeln 2010) and the EU￿ s policy to increase entrepreneurship after failure
(European Commission 2007). In terms of our model, these policies would increase the
probability of having high entrepreneurial talent ￿1. If banks have perfect information,
then an increase in ￿1 has both a direct and an indirect e⁄ect on equilibrium welfare.
The direct e⁄ect is that loan rates decrease in all periods. The indirect e⁄ect is that the
number ￿ t(￿1) of periods in which projects are ￿nanced (weakly) increases. Yet, if the
informational setting is PIB, PIBcr (and in some cases also under IM and IMcr), then
the indirect e⁄ect might not materialize. There always exists an equilibrium in which
the entrepreneur undertakes a low-risk project and does not get ￿nanced after failure.
Therefore, an increase in ￿1 does not necessarily entail a positive e⁄ect on entrepreneurial
activity among those who fail. Unless the banks￿policies and entrepreneurs￿risk-taking
behaviors become simultaneously coordinated to another equilibrium, only the direct ef-
fect unfolds.
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed a model of entrepreneurial ￿nance and risk taking where the extent
to which failed entrepreneurs are excluded from further start-up ￿nancing is determined
endogenously. The driver of our results is the evolution of banks￿beliefs about an en-
trepreneur￿ s talent and the interplay between these beliefs and her risk choices. If banks
can perfectly observe the entrepreneur￿ s actions, then the ￿rst-best outcome is realized
in any equilibrium: she ￿rst undertakes a number of high-risk projects and then, after
continuous failure, undertakes a low-risk project. The number of trials (weakly) increases
in the ex-ante probability of high talent.
This is not the unique equilibrium (eventually, this equilibrium does not exist at all) if
banks can only observe the riskiness of projects in their own loan portfolio (PIB). Instead,
there also exists an ine¢ cient equilibrium in which the entrepreneur undertakes a low-risk
project and becomes excluded from ￿nance after failure. This ine¢ ciency is due to the
fact that banks may expect the entrepreneur to undertake the low-risk project. Failure of
low-risk projects indicates low talent. Therefore, outside banks may refuse to ￿nance her
14after failure. The bank that ￿nanced the project then becomes a monopolistic supplier
of ￿nance to the entrepreneur. Hence, it is rational for the entrepreneur to undertake a
low-risk project.
If banks do not observe the riskiness of projects (IM), the equilibrium set depends on
the payo⁄structure. Given that the expected return of the high-risk project is su¢ ciently
close to that of the low-risk project, the entrepreneur always undertakes high-risk projects
in equilibrium. This outcome is ine¢ cient. Yet, it may be much better than the one-
shot ￿nancing equilibrium under PIB. If the expected return of the high-risk project is
su¢ ciently small relative to that of the low-risk project, then multiple equilibria exist as
under PIB.
We showed that sharing information about previous loan rates through credit registers
can ensure the existence of an e¢ cient equilibrium under PIB (and for some cases also
under IM). A low loan rate may indicate that the entrepreneur undertook a low-risk
project and therefore should not be ￿nanced after failure. Consequently, the entrepreneur
cannot gain by realizing the low-risk project too early.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Take ￿1 as given. Whenever E chooses j = L and the project fails, E knows that her talent
is low. She then does not undertake any further projects. Consider the set of assessments
in which E chooses j = H in periods t 2 f1;:::;t￿ ￿ 1g, j = L in period t￿, and no more
projects thereafter. Denote by V
(t￿)
t the expected payo⁄ of E at the beginning of period









yL ￿ 1; (12)
and for t 2 f1;:::;t￿ ￿ 1g
V
(t￿)
















1 = ￿1 and ￿E
t is given by (6) for each t 2 f2;:::;t￿g. Note that there must be a
t￿￿ such that V
(t￿)
1 is positive only if t￿ 2 f1;:::;t￿￿g. We therefore ￿nd that





































for all t < t￿. Note that V
(t￿)
1 is continuous in ￿1 for all t￿ 2 N. Thus, for each t 2 N
there is a ^ ￿1 < 1, such that ￿ t(￿1) > t whenever ￿1 > ^ ￿1.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 3










and consider an assessment (￿;￿) with the following properties:
￿ In period 1, Bk o⁄ers contracts
(k;r(L;￿1);pL) and (k;r(H;￿1);pH): (18)
￿ A bank Bk that did not ￿nance the project in period 1 has beliefs ￿k
t = 0 in all
periods t ￿ 2 and therefore does not o⁄er any contracts.
￿ A bank that ￿nanced the project in period 1 has a belief in period 2 that is derived
from Bayes￿rule. As long as it is pro￿table, this bank o⁄ers contracts with loan
rates equal to maxfr 2 R(")g.
￿ E undertakes projects whenever possible.
In this assessment, the expected payo⁄of E in period 2 is 0 regardless of her choice in
period 1. Therefore, it is optimal for her to choose a contract (k;r(L;￿1);pL) and j = L
in period 1 if
￿(￿1)(yL ￿ r(L;￿1)) ￿ (1 ￿ pH)￿(￿1)(yH ￿ r(H;￿1)); (19)
which is implied by (A1) given that " is su¢ ciently small. Facing Bertrand competition,





n2N with (￿[n];￿[n]) ! (￿;￿) in which ￿[n] is such that
E chooses j = L with probability (n ￿ 1)=n and j = H with probability 1=n in period 1





￿[n] ! 0 for any t > 1
and Hk
t that does not contain E￿ s actual risk choice in period 1.
16￿ t(￿1) ￿ P SE. Consider a strategy pro￿le with the following properties:
￿ In period 1, Bk o⁄ers the same contracts as in (18).













t is given by (6)) unless it observes that in a period
￿ 2 f1;:::;t ￿ 1g, E had chosen j = L or had not chosen contracts with loan
rates equal to r(H;￿E
￿ ) (where ￿E
￿ is given by (6)). In these cases, it does not o⁄er
any contracts.






￿ t(￿1) = ￿E
￿ t(￿1)
and ￿E
￿ t(￿1) is given by (6)) unless it observes that in a period ￿ 2 f1;:::;t ￿ 1g E had
chosen j = L or had not chosen contracts with loan rates equal to r(H;￿E
￿ ) (where
￿E
￿ is given by (6)). In these cases, it does not o⁄er any contracts.
￿ Banks o⁄er no contracts in any period t > ￿ t(￿1).
￿ Whenever banks o⁄er contracts as described above, E undertakes a high-risk project
in all periods t 2 f1;:::;￿ t(￿1) ￿ 1g and a low-risk project in period ￿ t(￿1).
To show that this can be the outcome of a SE, assume that E deviates in period t￿ <





. Given the banks￿strategy, the expected












and in a period t 2 f1;:::;t￿ ￿ 1g it is
~ V
(t￿)



















Note that these expressions equal those in (12) and (13) as " ! 0. It follows from
Proposition 1 that E has no incentive to deviate if " is su¢ ciently small. Furthermore, it





and j = L in any period









































































































and j = L in period
t if the right-hand side of (25) exceeds the right-hand side of (24). If " is su¢ ciently small,



















This can be used to show that (26) follows from yL < 2=(1 ￿ pH). Due to Bertrand
competition, no bank can pro￿tably deviate. The consistency of beliefs can be shown as
in the ￿rst part of the proof. Finally, the last claim of Proposition 3 directly follows from
Proposition 1.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of existence of the 1 ￿ P SE is straightforward and therefore omitted. Let
r(j;￿) be given by (17). To show the existence of the ￿ t￿P SE, consider a strategy pro￿le
with the following properties:













t is given by (6)) unless it observes that in a period ￿ 2
f1;:::;t ￿ 1g, E had chosen j = L. In this case, it does not o⁄er any contracts.






￿ t = ￿E
￿ t and ￿E
￿ t is given by
(6)) unless it observes that in a period ￿ 2 f1;:::;￿ t ￿ 1g, E had chosen j = L. In
this case, it does not o⁄er any contracts.
￿ Banks o⁄er no contracts in any period t > ￿ t.
￿ Whenever banks o⁄er contracts as described above, E undertakes a high-risk project
in all periods t 2 f1;:::;￿ t ￿ 1g and a low-risk project in period ￿ t.
To show that this can be the outcome of a SE if ￿1 is su¢ ciently high, assume that





. Given the banks￿









+ (1 ￿ ￿(￿
E
t￿))(yH ￿ 1): (28)
18For ￿1 ! 1 and " ! 0, this term becomes yL ￿ 1, while E￿ s expected payo⁄ at the












H (yL ￿ 1): (29)
Thus, (A2) ensures that E cannot pro￿tably deviate in any period t < ￿ t if ￿1 is su¢ ciently
high and " is su¢ ciently low. (A1) ensures that the same is true for period ￿ t. Following the
same steps as in the ￿rst part of the proof of Proposition 3, we can show that banks￿beliefs
can be consistent in all periods. Facing Bertrand competition, banks cannot pro￿tably
deviate. Finally, if ￿1 is su¢ ciently high and " is su¢ ciently low, total expected payo⁄s
in the 1 ￿ P SE must be smaller than in the ￿ t ￿ P SE. Otherwise, it would pay o⁄ for E
to deviate in period 1 of the considered ￿ t ￿ P assessment.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 6
1 ￿ P SE. The proof is very similar to the one of Proposition 3 and therefore omitted.
￿ t ￿ P SE. The proof is very similar to the one of Proposition 4 and therefore omitted.
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